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Abstract
The main section of this paper discusses competing theories ofaggregate
supply that are currently being utilized in macroeconomic models with
rational expectations. The distinction between flexible-priceequilibrium
models and models with nominal contracts is emphasized and three modelsof
the latter type are described and contrasted, it is argued thatrejection
of flexible-price equilibrium theories, as the evidenceseems to warrant,
does not require abandonment of the equilibrium approach. Alsoincluded
are remarks on the present status of the rational expectations version of the
natural-rate hypothesis. The second section of thepaper briefly discusses
a few issues concerning the equilibrium approach and aggregate demand, with
attention devoted to the overlapping-generations framework. The third
section considers a recent attempt, involving the use of "vectorautoregression"
models, to denigrate the importance of the Lucas critique of traditional
poli.cy-evaluation procedures.
Bennett T. McCallum




It has now been just over a decade since the start of the rational
expectations revolution in macroeconomics. In saying that, I am accepting
the conventional view that the first papers to be widely influential were
1/
those published in 1972 by Robert Lucas. As is well known, these were
soon followed by landmark pieces by Thomas Sargent (1973) (1976a), Sargent
and Neil Wallace (1975), and Robert Barro (1976) (l977a), as well as others
2/
by Lucas (1976) (1977). And, as is also well known, the revolution has
been highly controversial because of the criticism of prevailing views that
was implicit in the above-mentioned papers and explicit in others (e.g.,
Barro (1979), Lucas and Sargent (1978)).
Today the disputation seems to be less heated than it was a few years
ago, with members of the leading schools of thought openly recognizing
weaknesses in their own theories and strengths in those of others. Of course,
major differences continue to exist, as consideration of recent papers by
Taylor (1982), Kydland and Prescott (1982),andSargent and Wallace (1982)
will emphasize. But the terms of disagreement are no longer about the
hypothesis of rational expectations--some version of the latter is utilized
inalmost all current research--but about the nature of the economy within
which agents operate and form expectations.
In this regard, the portion of a macroeconomic model that most strongly
affects its policy-relevant characteristics is that pertaining to aggregate
supply behavior. Accordingly, I will begin this presentation by discussing
some competing theories of aggregate supply currently being utilized in
rational expectations (RE) models, with emphasis on the distinction between
"equilibrium't and "sticky-price" assumptions. This section will also include
a brief description of a model that I find attractive arid some discussion of2
the RE version of the natural-rate hypothesis. In the next section I will
more briefly mention a few issues involving specification of the aggregate
demand portion of macroeconomic models, with attention devoted to the role
of the overlapping-generations framework. Finally, I want to consider a
recent attempt to denigrate the importance of Lucas's critique (1976) of
traditional policy-evaluation techniques, an attempt that makes use of
"vector autoregression" models. Throughout I will take it for granted
that there is no need to spend time justifying the rational expectations
assumption itself.3
II. Flexible and Sticky Price Models
It is of course widely understood that properties of RE models with
multiperiod nominal contracts (e.g., Fischer (1977), Taylor (l979a)) are
very different from those in which prices adjust fully within each period.
Let us begin by considering which type is more useful for analysis of
actual present-day economies.
In my opinion there is at least one reason for believing that some type
of sticky-price model is needed to provide an empirically satisfactory
description of quarter-to-quarter or even year-to-year fluctuations in prices,
output, and other macroeconomic variables. In saying that, I have in mind
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several empirical regularities or "stylized facts" including the following:
(i) Output and employment magnitudes exhibit significant "persistence,"
i.e., positive serial correlation.
(ii) Output and employment magnitudes are strongly, positively related
4'
to contemporaneous money stock surprises.
(iii) Output and employment magnitudes are not strongly, positively related
to contemporaneous price level surprises.
(iv) Real wages do not exhibit countercyclical tendencies; indeed
they appear to be mildly procyclical.
Furthermore, I have in mind a fact of a different kind, namely, that
information concerning nominal aggregate variables--includingmoney stock
measures and various price indices--is available on a relatively prompt
basis. The relevant point, then, is that this availability is hard to
reconcile with fact (ii) in a flexible-price equilibrium model, for the
existence of real effects of monetary shocks depends, in these models,4
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upon agents' ignorance of contemporaneous values of nominal aggregates. It
was suggested by Lucas (1977) that this difficulty might be overcome if the
"true" relevant monetary aggregate were unobservable and thus measured
witherror. King (1981) has shown, however, that if observations are
availableon a "proxy" variable that differs randomly from the true un-
observable aggregate, output and employment should be unrelated to the
proxy. Thus, according to these models, output and employment should be
unrelated to movements in measured monetary aggregates, in contrast with
fact (ii). King's analysis has been further developed and implemented by
Boschen and Grossman (1983).
A second reason for doubting the adequacy of flexible-price equili-
brium models is provided by econometric studies which suggest that output
fluctuations are induced by anticipated monetary movements, as well as
surprises. These studies have some weaknessesand there is not a strict
one-to-one relationship between flexible-price equilibrium models and the
absence of real effects from anticipated money movements. The relation-
ship is close enough and the quality of the cited studies high enough,
however, that the findings are troublesome for the flexible-price hypothesis.
In this regard I would like to emphasizethatacteWtanceofthe-idea,
thatsomekind of price-level stickiness is necessary for explaining
observed time series data, does not require abandonment of the equilibrium
approach to macroeconomic analysis. To see this, imagine a model in which
nominal multiperiod contracts are endogenously explained as the response
of rational agents to adjustment, bargaining, or other "transactions"
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costs. As Lucas (1980, p.712) has recognized, such a model could be an
equilibrium model--one in which all agents optimize relative to correctly-
perceived constraints and in which the resulting supplies and demands are5
equated--though one without perfectly flexible prices. As such, it would
incorporate the virtues of equilibrium analysis, including the intellectual
discipline that it entails, a specification expressed in terms of policy-
invariant relationships, and the possibility of basing policy choices on
the utility of individual agents.
Indeed, such a model would seem to be precisely what is needed for
the analysis of stabilization policy. As Fischer (1977, p.204) acknowledged,
it is likely that the format and length of nominal contractsagreed to
by rational agents would change in response to major shifts in policy. So,
even if existing contract models were capable of providing a good
explanation of macroeconomic fluctuations within a single policy regime,
they would tend to be unreliable if used to predict the comparative effects
10/
of alternative regimes.
From the foregoing perspective, existing nominal contract models are
best seen as incomplete models--ones that treat as fixed important paraaeters
that would tend to be constant within regimes but to change across regimes.
Even in their present state these models are of interest, however, so I
would like to devote a few paragraphs to a comparison and discussion of
the two most influential, those of Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979.a) (1980).
For simplicity, I shall refer to two-period versions of each.
In both the Fischer and Taylor papers, a rudimentary aggregate demand
function--one that makes the quantity demanded a fixed stochastic function
of real money balances alone--is utilized, so no difference arises from
that component. The wage-price or aggregate supply components arevery
different, however, despite the common feature of two-period, staggered,
nominal wage contracts. Specifically, in each model nominalwages are6
set at the start of period t to apply to half of the workforce in periods
t and t+l, but the values at which these wages are set are chosen according
to different principles. In Fischer's model, the wages set for t and t+l
will usually differ from each other and each is chosen, in light of current
price-level expectations, so that the real wage is expected to clear the
labor market in the relevant period. In Taylor's model, by contrast, the
same value is set for periods t and t+l and is chosen to equal the average
of the nominal wage rates expected to prevail for the other half of the
workforce in t and t+l, with an adjustment added to take account of
(expected) excess demand.
Prices, moreover, are assumed to move in unison with the average wage
in Taylor's model, so that there is no systematic (or unsystematic) cyclical
variation in the real wage. Fischer, on the other hand, assumes that firms
select employment (hence, output) magnitudes in each period so as to equate
the marginal product of labor to the observed real wage. Consequently, there
is a tendency for the real wage to be high when employment is low.
Of these two models, Taylor's has attracted more attention and has been
the mare influential. One reason, undoubtedly, is that Taylor himself has
produced a number of technically sophisticated and economically interesting
applications involving actual data and policy issues of current concern.
I suspect that there isan additional reason, however, which is the existence
of a widespread belief that Taylor's model is substantially more consistent
with crucial facts. In particular, it is believed that Taylor's model is
more plausible than Fischer's because it generates more persistence (for
a given contract length) and does not yield the counterfactual implication
that real wages move countercyclically. Consequently, I think that it is7
important to understand that neither of these observations is entirely
compelling and that Taylor's model has some implications of its own that
are theoretically unattractive.
With respect to the persistence issue, it should be kept in mind that
there are several plausible ways of rationalizing persistence inany RE
model. Among these are the existence of employment adjustment costs, the
presence of finished-goods inventories, and the inability of agents to
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distinguish between permanent and transitory shocks. Any of these
features could be included in a variant of Fischer's model without altering
the properties that his paper focussed upon. Furthermore, the relevant
theoretical concepts involve output or employment measured relative to
capacity (natural rate) values. But of course we do not possess direct
observations on these relative magnitudes; the stylized fact (i) refers
to raw measures of output and employment or to measures adjusted by the
removal of a deterministic trend. And recent work by Nelson and
Plosser (1982), which relies upon stochastic trend removal,suggests that
there is much less persistence in the relevant adjusted series than the
raw or deterministically-detrended measures have indicated.
Next, the countercyclical real wage in Fischer's model does not come
from its wage-setting specification, but from an independent assumption
regarding employment determination--i.e., that firms equate the marginal
product of labor to the real wage. Now the counterpart of that relation in
Taylor's model is the condition that the (detrended) real wage is constant.
But that condition implies that product prices behave in the sameway as
12 /
averagenominal wages, which also seems counterfactual.8
These arguments suggest that the above-mentioned reasons for preferring
Taylor's model to Fischer's are not compelling. A point of equal or greater
importance is that Taylor's model possesses a questionable feature, namely,
a presumption that labor supply-demand behavior is fundamentally concerned
'with relative, rather than own, wages. As a result of this feature,
together with contract staggering, the model does not possess the natural-
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rateproperty as defined by Lucas (1972b). That is, the model is one in
which a suitably-designed monetary policy is capable of yielding a
permanent increase in output relative to its natural-rate value: monetary
14/
policy can keep unemployment "low" forever.
Having mentioned various shortcomings of the Fischer and Taylor models,
let me now discuss an alternative that I find attractive, one which conforms
to the natural rate hypothesis and also to all of the stylized facts
15 /
mentionedabove. For the sake of simplicity, and ease of comparison, the
discussion will presume a rudimentary aggregate demand schedule. This can
be expressed formally as
(1) =b+bi(m
-+ v b1 > 0
where y, m, and Pt are logs of output, the money stock, and the price level
while v is a white-noise disturbance. Also for simplicity, the log of the
"natural rate" level of output, y, is assumed to deviate from its previous
value only by virtue of a 'white-noise disturbance, u:
(2) =t_l+Ut.
In addition--and again only for the sake of simplicity--I assume that output
is perishable, so that no inventories are held.9
The crucial aspect of the model is theway in which prices are determined.
It is assumed thatPt is set, at the end of period t-l, at a level that is
expected to make the quantity demanded in t equal toa weighted average of
and y. Two basic ideas are involved in thisassumption. The first t
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is that firms find it optimal to meet all demandsat the quoted price.
Second, firms experience adjustment costs whenevery differs from but
also suffer opportunity costs whenever there isany discrepancy between y and y.
Then if both of these cost functionsare quadratic, producers will aim at
some value between and which we denote as Xy1 + .-X) Y1 with
the parameter X (0 < X < 1) reflecting therelative costliness of output
changes. Consequently, the price level is set ata value that satisfies
(1) expectationally, with +
(l_x.).Et_i inserted in place of
(3) +(1-X) Et_i =
b0+ b1(E1rn
Here, of course, Ei(.) denotes the mathematicalexpectation of the
indicated variable, conditionalupon realizations of all variables in
period t-l and earlier. The price-setting relation(3) can be expressed
in various ways. One version that I haveemphasized elsewhere takes the




- +Ei( = (l-)/b1> 0,
in which the relevant expected inflationrate is that pertaining to
p,
the value ofp that equates y to in (1).
The other main component of the modelincorporates Fischer's scheme
of nominal wage determination. Letw be the log of the average nominal
wage in period t and letz denote the log of the real wage, z =w
-
Pt.10
Also let be the natural-rate value of z, which evolves over time as
a random walk related to that generating Yt:
(4) z =z_1+ E(u) > 0.
Then with half of the wage contracts prevailing in t having been set at the
end of t-l, and the other half at the end of t-2, we have
(5) =(1/2)E i(z + + (1/2) E 2(z +
Finally, to complete the system we suppose that the monetary authority
sets m according to some policy feedback rule, utilizing data from periods
t-1 and before. Without specifying the form of the systematic component,
we can write
(6)n' =Etim + e,
thereby defining et as the (white noise) random component of policy behavior.
In principle, equations (l)-(6) govern the evolution of the six variables
-. — j,j,Ftu1t W 5J.V&L LL.LLJLLa.L.I.J W —
Itis easy to see from equations (l),(2),(3), and (6) that, in this
model, output conforms to the process
(7)
- =-i t-1 + b1e + v -u.
Thus we can verify by inspection that stylized facts (i), (ii), and (iii)
are mimicked by our model: output is positively related to monetary
surprises but not to one.period pric level surprises (as Pt = EtiP),
and both y and - arepositively autocorrelated. Furthermore, it can
be shown that, for a wide class of specifications for the systematic component•11
of monetary policy, zt and y are positively correlated. Thus the model
also conforms to the stylized fact (iv). And from (7) it is obvious.that
the natural-rate property obtains.
Indeed, it is clear from (7) that the famous policy-ineffectiveness
proposition obtains in the model at hand. But while that result is useful
as a counterexample to some mistaken notions about necessary conditions for
validity of the ineffectiveness proposition, I do not think that very much
should be made of it. The reason is that the result is not highly robust:
while it holds if the aggregate demand specification (1) is changed to
(1') =+(m -p)+ 2Et1( t+l - +
itdoes not hold if instead we have
(1") =+(m - +2E(p1 - +v.
Nor, more importantly, does it hold if the information set used in
computing the expectation of t+l includes the current interest rate, as
well as past values of all variables. This last specification would seem
to be empirically relevant, given the existence of daily reports on
interest rates in nation-wide markets.
But while I do not want to argue for the general validity of the
ineffectiveness proposition, even as a matter of theory, I do want to
mention parenthetically that many of the alleged theoretical demonstrations
of its invalidity rely on a misinterpretation. The point is that the
proposition asserts that the systematic components of monetary and fiscal
policies have no influence on the evolution of output or employment relative
to their natural rate (capacity, full-information) values--not to the raw12
values themselves. The proposition is designed to pertain to issues about
countercyclical stabilization policy, which has always been conceived of as
a device for keeping output and employment close to their natural-rate
values, not for altering the paths of the latter variables. A more extended
discussion of this issue, including some examples of published mis-
interpretations, is presented in NcCallum (1980, pp.726—729).
The model outlined above can be extended in many ways--by including
fiscal variables and/or inventory holdings, by positing more realistic
processes for and z, etc. --without altering its main properties.
Thus it provides, in my opinion, an attractive and useful framework for
thinking about macroeconomic fluctuations and stabilization policy. It
has some weaknesses, however, that should be acknowledged. First, the
implicit assumption that price changes are prohibitively costly within
each period, but costless between periods, is extreme and difficult to
justify except by definition of the "period." And with that justification
there is no guarantee that the periods so defined will correspond to the
quarter-year periods in which most actual data is reported. Also, the
length of a theoretical period could be affected by extreme conditions,
such as those experienced during hyperinflations. Consequently, the period
definition may not be ul1y policy-invariant.
Perhaps the most basic weakness of the model is the absence of any
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conipelling explanation for the absence of indexing. Why is it, in other
words, that posted prices do not come with a proviso that automatically
adjusts them in response to monetary surprises? The usual answer is that
such arrangements are costly, but the validity of that answer is by no
means self-apparent. The difficulty is, however, one that is not specific13
to this model. It merely reflects economists' incomplete understanding of
why contracts are often made in nominal terms. More generally, the above-
mentioned flaws are a reflection of the fact that this model is incomplete,
in the sense described above. An equilibrium rationalization of its price-
setting arrangements has not been developed.
To conclude my discussion of issues involving aggregate supply, I
would like to return to the subject of the natural rate hypothesis (NRH)
and comment upon its present status. In particular, I want to emphasize
18/
that a number of influential researchers in the Keynesian tradition
have in recent years expressed agreement with the NRH, yet have continued
19 / toconduct analysis in models that do not possess the NRH property.
A prominent example of a specification of this type is provided by models
that incorporate the concept of a "nonaccelerating-inflation rate of
unemployment" (NAIRU). Clearly, if there exists a stable negative relation-
ship between unemployment and the acceleration magnitude (i.e., change in
the inflation rate), then the unemployment rate can be permanently lowered
by permanently accepting a higher rate of change of inflation-- in contra-
diction to the NRH. Another example is provided by models that include
demand and supply functions expressed in real terms together with a partial
adjustment relation for a nominal price variable and the assumption that
the transaction quantity is the smaller of supply and demand (or that
20/
demand is determining). In such a formulation, there is an implied
permanent tradeoff between the rate of change of the price variable and
real excess demand.
Proponents of such specifications would no doubt admit that their
implications regarding unemployment magnitudes under conditions of sustained
accelerating inflation are implausible, but would presumably contend that14
the models are not intended to be applicable to extreme policies of that
type. For predicting the consequences of less extreme policies, they would
claim, the models are appropriate. It is not clear, however, that such a
claim is justifiable. What is needed for the modelts predictions to be
plausible is that the policy followed be essentially the same as that of
the sample period used in estimating the relationship. But to agree to that
limitation is to admit that the model cannot be used for most interesting
questions. In terms of Tobin's (1980, pp.66-68) exercise, for example,
I would say that a gradual but reliable and sustained decrease in the rate
of growth of nominal GNP--or the money stock or any other nominal aggregate--
is very unlike the policies of the past two decades. Thus the simulation
predictions are not persuasive.
More generally, I would argue that the non-conformity of any model
to the NRB property provides prima facie evidence of some implied form of
irrationality and an associated vulnerability of the model to the famous
Lucas (1976) "critique." In other words, non-conformity of any model to
the NRH indicates that it will be systematically unreliable in predicting
,.'l/
the consequences of alternative policy choices.Other points concerning
the Lucas critique will be discussed in the sectioas that follow..15
III. Aggregate Demand
To this point we have been concerned with issues involving aggregate
supply behavior. Let us then more briefly consider some developments having
22/
to do with aggregate demand.
As our previous discussion hinted, Lucas, Sargent, and other leaders in
the RE area have advocated the use of aggregative general equilibrium models
for macroeconomic policy analysis. The object of this strategy is to avoid
the weaknesses of traditional macroeconomic models, weaknesses that were
emphasized in Lucass critique (1976). The hope is that it may be possible
to develop models that are genuinely structural--i.e., policy invariant--by
working "at the level of objective functions, constraint sets, and market-
clearing conditions" (Sargent, 1982, p.383). Since this equilibrium approach
does not limit the user to flexible price models, it is almost impossible not
to sympathize with it, at least at the level of principle. Adherence to the
approach is not a guarantee of success, however: if a model is based on a
poorly-specified objective function it will be a poor model, explicit maxi-
mization analysis notwithstanding.
Since this last qualification is obvious to the point of triviality, an
example of how the approach can go astray may be of some interest. The
example that I have in mind involves the application of a class of overlapping-
generations (OG) models to problems in monetary economics. The class of OG
models in question is that in which, although there is an inherently useless
entity called "fiat money," the specification excludes any cash-in-advance
or money-in-the-utility-function feature that would represent a transactions-
facilitating property for that entity. Accordingly, the entity does not serve,
in these models, as a medium of exchange; its only function is as a store of
23/
value. Consequently, several striking and unusual conclusions are obtained16
when the entity is interpreted as money. For exatnvle, if the government
causes the stock of money to grow at a rate even slightly in excess of the
rate of output growth, the price level will be infinite (i.e., money
will be valueless). Second, equilibria in which the price level is finite
will be Pareto optimal if and only if the growth rate of the money stock is
non-positive. Third, "open-market" increases in the stock of money have no
effect on the price level. I have argued at length, however, that these
unusual conclusions obtain because of the model's neglect of the medium-of-
exchange role (McCallum, 1983). If the model is modified so as to reflect
this role for the entity called money, its unusual conclusions vanish.
Consequently, the unmodified class of OG models evidently provides a misleading
vehicle for the analysis of economies in which there is a medium of exchange.
It remains to be explained what this OG example has to do with the
equilibrium approach. To understand the connection let us recall that an
essential aspect of the approach is the development of policy-invariant
relations. Now in dynamic settings, as Sargent (1982) has stressed, standard
asset demand functions may not be policy-invariant; one must look "beyond
decision rules to the objective functions that agents are maximizing and the
constraints that they are facing" (p.383). But the influence on agents'
constraints of the store-of-value function of money is clear and simple to
express analytically, while the influence of the medium-of-exchange function
is just the opposite. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to devise a general
equilibrium setting in which the medium-of-exchange role is both rigorously
and convincingly depicted. The traditional method has of course been to include
real money balances as an argument of agents' utility functions, but that is
an unsatisfying practice which clearly must be proxying for something more
fundamental. Together these considerations encourage analysts to shun the17
traditional approach and adopt ones that focus attention on money as a store
of value. And because they are well-suited in important ways for the
analysis of store-of-value issues, OG models provide an attractive vehicle.
Thus it is not very surprising that an OG model without medium-of-exchange
features would be adopted by researchers striving to overcome the Lucas
critique. But that attempt will nevertheless be unsuccessful if the model
is used for certain monetary issues, for neglect of the medium-of-exchange
function constitutes a potentially serious specification error. The Lucas
critique itself amounts to a reminder (of an especially important type)
that specification errors will keep a model from being policy invariant.
Turning to a substantive matter, it is interesting to note that an OG
model of the type discussed above has recently been used by Sargent and
Wallace (1982) in an attempted rehabilitation of the infamous "real bills"
doctrine. Since one of Henry Thornton's important contributions to monetary
economics was his criticism of that doctrine, a few brief remarks should
be in order. In their recent paper, Sargent and Wallace argue that (among
other things) the price level is determinate under a real-bills policy
regime that pegs the interest rate at zero, a finding that contrasts
sharply with the price-level indeterminacy result of their famous (1975)
paper. Examination of the recent argument indicates, however, that
determinacy is not actually established. What the paper shows is that each
agent faces the same real budget constraint under the real-bills regime as
under a "laissez-faire" regime in which the stock of fiat money is held
fixed. But this implies only that the real aspects of the model's
equilibria are the same under the two regimes; nothing is implied about
nominal magnitudes. Furthermore, the interest rate in the Sargent-Wallace
(1982) model does not, because of this model's neglect of the medium-of-
exchange role of money, correspond to interest rates in actual economies.18
Thus pegging its real value at zero does not require a negative real return
on money (i.e., positive inflation) as is the case in settings in which non-
monetary assets command higher rates of return than money because of the
latter's transaction-facilitating properties. Consequently, the recent
Sargent-wallace paper does not provide a convincing reason for believing
Thornton's analysis to be incorrect.19
IV. The VAR Challenge to- the Lucas Critique
The final topic to be discussed also concerns the Lucas critique.
Previously I have claimed that its basic message--i.e., that traditional
econometric models are poorly designed for policy evaluations because their
basic relationships are unlikely to be policy invariant--has beenvery
widely accepted, even by economists who dispute other notions associated
with the RE revolution (McCalluxn 1979, 1980). That situation still prevails,
I believe, but within the past few months a notable challenge has arisen.
More specifically, a number of prominent economists, who are certainly well
aware of the critique, have authored papers in which so-called vector auto-
24/
regression (VAR) models are used for policy analysis. These VAR models
are, as is well-known, constructed in a manner that involves no attempt to
represent structural relationships; they consist of a set of reduced—form
equations in which lagged values of the system's variables are used to
explain current values, with all variables treated as endogenous.
Consequently, VAR systems would seem to be even more vulnerable to the
critique than the traditional econometric models that Lucas considered.
One is naturally led, then, to ask: what is the justification given by those
who have used VARs for policy analysis? In fact most users have provided -
nojustification themselves, but have referred to a recent paper by
Christopher Sims, the originator of VAR techniques. Let us then consider
the argument put forth in that paper (Sims, 1982).
One important theme of Sims's discussion is that equilibrium-approach
econometric techniques (exemplified by Hansen and Sargent (1980)) are
unlikely to lead to accurate predictions of the effects of real-time changes20
inpolicy rules, as opposed to cross-regime steady-state comparisons. As
it happens, that suggestion seems to me to be correct. But it also seems
rather beside the point, since Lucas, Sargent, and other equilibrium-
approach leaders have not claimed to be able to use their models in that
way. Instead, they have expressed the aim of being able to make valid
comparisons of the properties of stochastic steady states generated by
alternative maintained policy regimes.
Another theme of Sims's paper is that genuine policy-rule or regime
changes are extremely rare in actuality. Most policy actions involve
instead the resetting of policy instruments in response to recent
developments in the economy, a type of activity that Sims calls "normal
policymaking." Again I wculd agree with the observation--but point out
thatit is in no way inconsistent with the Lucas critique.
In addition, however, Sims claims that VAR methods can be useful in
thecontext of normal policymaking. Since this claim appears to be
inconsistent with the message of the critique, let us briefly examine the
argument. Under a given policy regime, a policymaker's objectives are
by definition unchanging through time. So if the structure of the economy
were known and also unchanging, policy feedback rules would be unchanging
and there would be no purpose for policy exercises using any kind of model.
But of course the true structure of any actual economy is imperfectly known
and probably changing, so there could often be some potential gain from re-
estimation of models used to design policy. And with objectives constant,
autoregressive representations of expectational variables may be changing
only slowly and gently, so VAR models may not go badly astray in the way
described by Lucas. Thus there could be some benefits from period-by-
period re-estimation of VAR systems and their utilization in the selection21
of current instrument settings.
In this case, the argument seems plausible but not extremely
consequential. What it suggests is that VARs can be helpful to policy-
makers, but only if the latter continue to behave in approximately the
same way as in the past. There is no claim that VARs could be useful in
evaluating the effects of substantially different sustained policies.
Furthermore, the argument provides no compelling reason for believing
that VAR methods would be superior, even in the context of normal policy-
making, to Hansen-Sargent techniques.
Now let me turn to my outright disagreements with Sims's paper, of
which there are two. The first involves an application of VAR methods in
the context of an analysis of announced policy plans of theReagan
administration, I think it is fair to say that these plans, asannounced,
represent a substantial break with past policies. How, then, does Sims
justify use of the VAR models? Apparently, his presumption is that the
public does not believe that a genuine regime change will actually take
place: 'Preciseiy because those vying for control of policy willpropose
to make permanent changes in the rule much more often than they will succeed
in doing so, the public is likely to discount their rhetoric and reactto
the actual course they set for policy as if it were a disturbance to the
existing probabilistic structure" (1982, p.139). Given this assumption
that the public disbelieves in a regime change, there are two possibilities
either the public is correct in its disbelief or it is incorrect. But note
that if Sims is assuming the former--that the "proposed paths ofpolicy
variables are ..,notattainable"--then he is evaluating the effects of
a hypothetical change in policy under the assumption that there is no change
in policy. This, clearly, involves a logical contradiction thatnegates22
any conclusion. The other possibility is that the public is incorrect in
believing that there is no change in regime. In this case there is no
logical contradiction, but the analysis presumes systematically incorrect
expectations. To the extent that the public (correctly) believes in the
policy change, Sims's predictions will be incorrect. And Sims shows no
inclination to assume systematically incorrect expectations, as a general
25 /
matter.Thus his arguments concerning the Reagan plans are unsatisfactory.
My other objection is that the general tone of Sims's discussion seems
likely to encourage economists to conceive of policy in terms of isolated
actions rather than sustained rules. Such encouragement is, of course, in
direct opposition to the advice of Lucas, Sargent, and other RE advocates.
Lucas (1976) (1978) has argued eloquently that economists should focus their
attention on sustained rules, in part because that is the most that there
is any chance of doing well. This position seems to me correct. The
profession hardly knows enough about deterministic steady states to
evaluate their relative merits--consider the difficulties in conceptualizing
the costs of anticipated inflation--much less, those of stochastic
steady states or alternative sequences of arbitrary policy actions.
Furthermore, actual policy makers are strongly inclined to focus attention
on today's situation, to the neglect of both future and past. To me it
seems undesirable for the economics profession to encourage them in this
inclination, as it did during the period of time between the Keynesian and
rational expectations revolutions.References
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1.Specifically, Lucas (1972a) (1972b). Of course a few papers had
previously been published using rational expectations in macro-
economic settings, but these did not have a great deal of impact.
2. Important items were also produced by Fischer (1977), Taylor (1979a)
(1979b), and others.
3. Evidence supporting these facts appears in a large number of studies,
including Sargent (1976),.Barro (1977a),Nishkin (1982), Sims (1980),
Kerinan and Geary (1982), and Gordon (1982).
4.Here and below I usethe term "surprise" to refer to a one-period
expectationalerror of theform m -Eim,in notation discussed
below.
5. This ignorance is required, to be more precise, in the three leading
flexible-price equilibrium models, namely, those of Lucas (1972a),
Lucas(1973), and Barro (1981, pp. 42-50). It is possible that other
such models do not have this property.
6. The relevant point was mentioned by Barro (1981) and was very recently
emphasized by Grossman (1982). Grossman recognizes, but does not
accept, the possibility that money-output correlations are due to
"reserve causation," i.e., monetary responses to output movements
generated by shocks to technology or preferences, as suggested by
King and Plosser (1982).
7. See, for example, Gordon (198 )andNishkin (1982).8. Movements in "natural ratelt values of output or employment are
assumed to be representable by trends, in contrast to the evidence
given by Nelson and Plosser (1982). Also, the methods of over-
coming the "observational equivalence" difficulty (Sargent, 1976b)
are riot entirely satisfying.
9. The difficulty with this exercise comes in understanding why
contracts are set in nominal terms without indexation.
10. The problem is of course compounded in attempts to predict
the effects of real-time changes in regimes because expectations
are unlikely to adjust immediately to the new policy rule.
11. The last two features have been analyzed by Blinder and Fischer
(1981) and Brunner, Cukierman, arid Meltzer (1980), respectively,
while the first has been emphasized most notably by Sargent.
12. My argument is riot that real wage movements induce business
cycles, but that some systematic movements in real wages are observed.
13. With staggering, relative wages pertain to values set in different
periods. If the relationship between such values depends upon
output (relative to capacity), as Taylor's model assumes, then the
latter variable will be affected by the trajectory of nominal wage
settlements. I am indebted to Taylor for explaining to me that it
is not an assumed concern for relative nominal wages, as opposed to
relative real wages, that is responsible for this feature.
14.Fischer'smodel, by contrast, does possess the natural-rate policy.15. This specification is mentioned, but not investigated, in McCallum
(1980, P. 735).
16. The analogous requirement vould not seem extreme or unusual in
a version of the model in which inventories are held.
17. This issue was introduced by Barro (1977b).
18. Including Tobin (1980), Modigliani (1977), and Gordon (1982).
19. See Tobin (1980, pp. 66-68), Modigliani and Papedemos (1975), and
Gordon and King (1982).
20. This sort of formulation mars, for example, an interesting and
otherwise attractive study by Smyth (1982).
21. This is, I would suggest, the true message of Lucas (1972b) and
one of the most basic messages of the RE revolution.
22. of course the distinction is not a clean one in equilibrium models,
since agents in such models make factor supply and commodity demand
choices simultaneously and in response to the same wealth and price
variables. What is here meant by an "aggregate demand" topic is one
that focuses attention on saving and/or asset-demand relationships.
23. Notable items in the literature in question are Bryant and Wallace
(1979), Sargent and Wallace (1982), and Wallace (1980).
24. Examples are provided by Friedman (1982), Gordon and King (1982). and
Litterman (1982). Friedman does not carry out policy simulations
but his "two-target" proposal for monetary policy is based in part on an
assumption that VAR relationships are policy invariant.
25. This is not, of course, an endorsement of these plans.